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25 Luglio
The 25 Luglio (, Italian for "July 25th") denotes the events in spring and summer 1943 in Italy, which culminated with the meeting of the Grand Council of Fascism on 24–25 July 1943, the passing of a vote of no confidence against Benito Mussolini, and the change of the Italian government.〔Bianchi (1963), p. 609〕〔Bianchi (1963), p. 704〕 These events were the result of parallel plots led respectively by Count Dino Grandi and King Victor Emmanuel III: their final outcome was the fall from power of the Italian Fascist government after 21 years and the arrest of Mussolini.〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 21〕〔De Felice (1996), p. 1391〕
== Background ==
At the beginning of 1943 the military situation for Italy looked bleak. The collapse of the African front on 4 November 1942 and the Allied landings in North Africa on 8–12 November had exposed Italy to an invasion of the Allied forces.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1092〕 The defeat of the Italian expeditionary force (ARMIR) in Russia, the heavy bombings of the cities, and the lack of food and fuel demoralized the population: the majority of the population wanted to end the war and denounce the alliance with Germany.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1117〕 Italy needed massive German aid in order to maintain control of Tunisia, the last stronghold of the Axis powers in Africa. Moreover, Italy's Duce, Benito Mussolini, was persuaded the war could be decided in the Mediterranean theater, and wanted to convince Hitler to seek a separate peace with Russia and move the bulk of the German Army south.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1125〕 At a meeting at Klessheim, on 29 April 1943, the Duce exposed his ideas to Hitler, who rejected them. The pressing request for reinforcements to defend the bridgehead in Tunisia was refused by the Wehrmacht, which no longer trusted the Italian will to maintain resistance.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1137〕 Besides the military situation, another main factor of uncertainty for Italy was the health of Mussolini: the duce was depressed and sick, and only after months with strong abdominal pain, two of the best Italian clinicians, Profs. Frugoni and Cesa Bianchi, diagnosed gastritis and duodenitis of nervous origin, excluding, after some hesitation, the possibility that Mussolini was suffering from cancer.〔Bianchi (1963), p. 283〕 Because of his illness, the Duce was often forced to stay at home, depriving Italy of effective government.
In this situation, several groups belonging to four different circles (the royal court, the antifascist parties, the fascism and the general Staff) started to look for a way out. Several aristocrats like Crown Princess Maria José, members of the upper classes and politicians belonging to the pre-Fascist elites, independently started several plots aiming at establishing contacts with the Allies. Unfortunately, none of them understood that the war had become ideological with the declaration of Casablanca stating that the Allies would only accept unconditional surrender. Moreover, despite the Crown Princess' involvement, the Anglo-Americans expected a move from higher-placed personalities, like the King, and disregarded contacts with these groups.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1168〕 The antifascist parties, weakened by 20 years of dictatorship, were still in an embryonic state.〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 29〕 Moreover, all except the communists and the republicans of the ''Partito d’Azione'' waited for a signal from Victor Emmanuel, but in vain: the King's character, realist and skeptical at the same time, his fears, his constitutional scruples, and the fact that the monarchy was almost certainly finished regardless of how the war turned out〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 74〕 contributed to his inaction.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1174〕〔De Felice (1996), p. 1132〕 The King had considerable contempt towards the old pre-Fascist politicians, whom he ironically called "revenants" ("ghosts" in French)〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 77〕 and didn't entirely trust those who claimed that the Anglo-Americans would not seek to exact revenge upon Italy.〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 76〕 Last but not least, Victor Emmanuel retained his trust in Mussolini, and he hoped that the Duce could save the situation once again.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1180〕 Consequently, the King kept his own counsel and isolated himself from all those who tried to learn his intentions.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1169〕 Among them was the new Chief of the General Staff, General Vittorio Ambrosio, a Piemontese, not of high intelligence, but devoted to the King and hostile to the Germans. Ambrosio was persuaded that the war was lost for Italy, but he never thought to take a personal initiative to change the situation without first consulting with Victor Emmanuel.〔De Felice (1996), p. 1126〕 On the other side Ambrosio, helped by his right-hand man, Giuseppe Castellano, and by Giacomo Carboni (both of whom would play key roles in the happenings which would lead to the armistice of 8 September 1943), slowly proceeded to occupy several key positions in the armed forces with officials devoted to the king. Moreover, he tried to bring back to Italy as many forces as possible among those which were abroad, but it was difficult to do that without raising the suspicions of the Germans.〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 46〕
On 6 February 1943, Mussolini carried out the most wide-ranging government reshuffle in 21 years of Fascist power.〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 56〕 Almost all the ministers were changed: the most important heads which fell were those of Galeazzo Ciano (the son-in-law of the duce), Dino Grandi, Giuseppe Bottai, Guido Buffarini Guidi and Alessandro Pavolini.〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 57〕 The two most important goals of this operation (placating public opinion and vital segments of the Fascist Party itself) were not achieved, since the situation was too compromised.〔 Among the new appointments, the best was the new Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (the Duce took over the department himself) Giuseppe Bastianini, a serious Umbrian well aware of the seriousness of the situation.〔 Bastianini's strategy was twofold: on the one hand, like Mussolini, he tried to argue in favor of a peace between Germany and the USSR,〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 65〕 and on the other he aimed to create a block of Balkan countries (the junior Axis partners Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) led by Italy, who should act as a counterbalance to the excessive power of the German Reich in Europe. In April the Duce took two other important actions: on 14 April he substituted the chief of the police, Carmine Senise (a man of the King) with Lorenzo Chierici, while five days later he changed the young and inexperienced secretary of the Party, Aldo Vidussoni, with Carlo Scorza.〔De Felice in Grandi (1983), p. 58〕 While Senise was accused of inefficiency during the March strikes in northern Italy, with the appointment of Scorza, a hardliner, Mussolini wanted to galvanize the Party.〔
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